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
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**Report of the
Special Advisory Task Force
on Massport**

**Presented to
Governor Jane Swift**

State Library of Massachusetts
State House, Boston

December 4, 2001



Findings of the Task Force: Security

1. *There is an immediate need for significantly enhanced security infrastructure and new procedures within Massport, most notably at Logan Airport.*
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Introduction:

It is not fully known which of the many weaknesses in the nation's aviation security system were exploited on September 11th, thus facilitating the hijacking of four commercial aircraft on route from three airports, including Logan. It is clear, however, that serious weaknesses existed with far more devastating impacts than previously thought. The terrorists who boarded the four flights did not, except for their criminal conspiracy, violate regulations or laws. The weapons *apparently* used in the hijackings - box cutters, and knives - were lawful to carry on board under then-existing Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations.

The hijackings laid bare the heart of the aviation security problem facing all U.S. airports, not just Logan. The fragmentation of responsibility among three parties - the FAA, the airlines and airports - created a system where everyone was involved in aviation security, but no one was singularly responsible. The result has been diminished security due to ineffective communication among these three parties and other important agencies, such as the FBI. Differing priorities and the inconsistent application of rules and regulations furthers this problem.

Appendix B discusses aviation securities practices in the United States, both prior to and following September 11th in great detail. It is highly recommended background reading, which will place our findings regarding security practices at Massport in the proper context.

A. Security at Boston Logan International Airport has suffered many of the weaknesses found throughout the U.S. system, although some other airports have been more aggressive about implementing enhanced security measures.

Federal Aviation Authority Regulations (FAR) 107 and 108 have set out airport and airline responsibilities, respectively, regarding security (*See Appendix B*). The FAA recently noted in the final rulemaking for FAR 107:

"federal law assigns solely to aircraft operators the responsibility for passenger screening. That law cannot be overcome by regulation."⁴

⁴ Provisions of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act signed into law by the President on November 19, 2001, will transfer the responsibility for passenger and baggage screening

Like the majority of airports in the U.S., Massport followed the dictates of the FAA with regard to passenger screening. However, on at least one occasion (June 2001), Massport challenged the airlines over what it correctly perceived as laxity in their practices regarding employee criminal background checks. The airlines complained to the FAA, who in effect sided with them. Massport offered to work in partnership with the FAA and the air carriers to resolve the issue. Then came the events of September 11th; in response to the tragedy, all securities practices, whether by airlines, airports or the FAA, have come under far more intensive review and scrutiny.

Prior to September 11th security lapses at Logan received significant media attention, including:

- From 1991 to 2000, FAA agents testing the airline screening systems managed to slip 234 guns, grenades and bombs past checkpoint screeners and their x-ray machines. Logan ranked fifth in the country for security violations.
- From 1997 to early 1999, the FAA found at least 136 security violations and fined the airlines and Massport \$178,000 for these lapses.
- In 1999, a 17-year old climbed a Logan perimeter fence, walked 2 miles across restricted areas, and stowed aboard a British Airways flight.
- Logan lacked video cameras in passenger screening areas of the terminals.
- The FAA has cited Massport for misplacing keys to secure areas. Massport had to re-key all locks on the airport perimeter and institute a lock-and-key audit program to avoid the imposition of fines.
- There have been ongoing public reports of security breaches, such as bullets and knives going undetected at screening checks, and an unattended checkpoint, which allowed unscreened passengers to enter secure areas of the terminal.

Although most other major U.S. airports have experienced similar lapses, these reports have fostered a lack of public confidence in security at Logan, heightened by the events of September 11th.

from the airlines to the U.S. DOT (See *Appendix B* for further information about the Act). Since September 11th, the FAA has allowed Maryland DOT to "supplement" airline contractor staff at Baltimore-Washington International Airport's passenger screening checkpoints. Similar types of initiatives by other airports would likely be approved during this transition period.